US Martial Law and Domestic Detention Camps as of December 1, 2004

In the event of civil insurrection or physical resistance to U.S. government policies, the official machinery is now in place for swift containment of areas of insurrection by U.S. military forces, to include the various State National Guards, Special Forces and Military Police units.

It is to be stressed that while these plans, which have been maturing since the Reagan Administration and are now fully functional, are only contingency plans. It would require a Presidential Order to activate them.

When President Ronald Reagan was considering invading Nicaragua he issued a series of executive orders that provided the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with broad powers in the event of a "crisis" such as "violent and widespread internal dissent or national opposition against a US military invasion abroad". They were never used.

But recent pronouncements by Bush's now-retired domestic security chief Tom Ridge and an official with the U.S. Civil Rights Commission should fire concerns that these powers could be employed or a de facto drift into their deployment could occur

On July 20, 2002, the Detroit Free Press ran a story entitled "Arabs in US could be held, official warns". The story referred to a member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission who foresaw the possibility of internment camps for Arab Americans. FEMA has practiced for such an occasion.

FEMA, whose main role is disaster response, is also responsible for handling US domestic unrest. From 1982-84 Colonel Oliver North assisted FEMA in drafting its civil defense preparations. Details of these plans emerged during the 1987 Iran-Contra scandal. They included executive orders providing for suspension of the constitution, the imposition of martial law, internment camps, and the turning over of government to the president and FEMA

A Miami Herald article on July 5, 1987, reported that the former FEMA director Louis Guiffrida's deputy, John Brinkerhoff, handled the martial law portion of the planning. The plan was said to be similar to one Giuffrida had developed earlier to combat "a national uprising by black militants". It provided for the detention "of at least 21 million African-Americans” in "assembly centers or relocation camps."

Currently, Brinkerhoff is with the highly influential Anser Institute for Homeland Security. Following a request by the Pentagon in January 2002 that the U.S. military be allowed the option of deploying troops on U.S. streets, the institute in February 2002 published a paper by Brinkerhoff arguing in defense of the legality of this. He alleged that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which has long been accepted as prohibiting such deployments, has simply been misunderstood and misapplied. The preface to the article also provided the revelation that the national plan he had worked on, under Giuffrida, was "approved by Reagan, and actions were taken to implement it".

By April 2002, the US military had created a Northern Command to aid Homeland defense. Reuters reported that the command is "mainly expected to play a supporting role to local authorities." However, Ridge, the Director of Homeland Security, has just advocated a review of U.S. law regarding the use of the military for law enforcement duties

Disturbingly, the full facts and final contents of Reagan's national plan remain uncertain. This is in part because President Bush took the unusual step of sealing the Reagan presidential papers, to specifically include the documentation on the declaration of martial law in the United States and its implementation, after he took over the presidency in November 2001. However, many of the key figures of the Reagan era are now part of the present administration, including John Poindexter, to whom Oliver North later reported.

At the time of the Reagan initiatives, the then attorney-general, William French Smith, wrote to the national security adviser, Robert McFarlane: "I believe that the role assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the revised Executive Order exceeds its proper function as a co-coordinating agency for emergency preparedness ... this department and others have repeatedly raised serious policy and legal objections to an 'emergency czar' role for FEMA."

Criticism of the Bush Administration's response to September 11 echoes Smith's warning. On June 7 2002, Nixon's former presidential counsel John Dean spoke of the U.S. sliding into a "constitutional dictatorship" and martial law as a result of the September 11, 2001 events.

In a revealing admission the Director of Resource Management for the U.S. Army confirmed the

validity of a memorandum relating to the establishment of a civilian inmate labor program under development by the Department of the Army. The document states, "Enclosed for your review and comment is the draft Army regulation on civilian inmate labor utilization" and the procedure to "establish civilian prison camps on installations." Cherith Chronicle, June 1997.

Under President Bush's "National Strategy For Homeland Security", FEMA will be placed under the Office of Homeland Security. Both Homeland Security and the Department of Defense planned to participate "in homeland security training that involves military and civilian emergency response", provoking comparison to Rex-84. And now, the Bush administration is moving to give FEMA disturbing new responsibilities.

Earlier, President Bush had ensured there would be no current FBI/FEMA conflict, mandating that FEMA work closely with the DOJ (of which the FBI is part), creating what Bush called a "seamlessly integrated" network. With this bond between FEMA and the DOJ, the Administration effectively voided the inter-departmental checks which stopped FEMA's earlier abuses.

According to the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA "will continue to change the emergency management culture from one that reacts to terrorism, to one that proactively helps communities and citizens avoid becoming victims". Paradoxically, FEMA's prior debacle was a direct outgrowth of its pursuit of proactive methods, its attempt to legitimize the assumption of extraordinary powers under the very cloak of "counter terrorism".

Civilian internment camps or prison camps, more commonly known as concentration camps, have been the subject of much rumor and speculation during the past few years in America. Several publications have devoted space to the topic and many talk radio programs have dealt with the issue.

However, Congressman Henry Gonzales (D, Texas) clarified the question of the existence of civilian detention camps. In an interview the congressman stated, "the truth is yes - you do have these stand by provisions, and the plans are here...whereby you could, in the name of stopping terrorism...evoke the military and arrest Americans and put them in detention camps."

Currently (December, 2004), President  Bush and Homeland Security have authorized preliminary studies for the rapid construction of a National Detention Center Program-controlled series of detention centers, to be added to the existing 600 units now in place

The Department of Homeland Security is consulting with an Israeli company, Israeli Prison Systems, Ltd.  for the expedited construction of modular  internment camps‘ Interment Camps’ generally located in rural and relatively uninhabited areas throughout the Continental United States and Alaska. .

A Brief History of U.S. Civilian Internment Camps

The concept of mass internment camps was implemented during the decade of the 1930's when the idea was either integrated into national security planning or put to actual use in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and the United States under Roosevelt.

On August 24, 1939, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover met with President Franklin Roosevelt to develop a detention plan for the United States

On August 3, 1948, J. Edgar Hoover met with Attorney General J. Howard McGrath to form a plan whereby President Truman could suspend constitutional liberties during a national emergency. The plan was code-named "Security Portfolio" and, when activated, it would authorize the FBI to summarily arrest up to 20,000 persons and place them in national security detention camps. Prisoners would not have the right to a court hearing or habeas corpus appeal. Meanwhile, "Security Portfolio" allowed the FBI to develop a watch list of those who would be detained, as well as detailed information on their physical appearance, family, place of work, etc

Two years later Congress approved the Internal Security Act of 1950 which contained a provision authorizing an emergency detention plan. Hoover  was unhappy with this law because it did not suspend the constitution and it guaranteed the right to a court hearing (habeas corpus). "For two years, while the FBI continued to secretly establish the detention camps and work out detailed seizure plans for thousands of individuals, Hoover kept badgering...[Attorney General McGrath for] official permission to ignore the 1950 law and carry on with the more ferocious 1948 program. On November 25, 1952, the attorney general...caved in to Hoover."

Congress repealed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 more than twenty years later in 1971. Seemingly the threat of civilian internment in the United States was over, but not in reality. The Senate held hearings in December, 1975, revealing the ongoing internment plan which had never been terminated. The report, entitled, "Intelligence Activities, Senate Resolution 21", disclosed the covert agenda. In a series of documents, memos and testimony by government informants, the picture emerged of the designs by the federal government to monitor, infiltrate, arrest and incarcerate a potentially large segment of American society.

The Senate report also revealed the existence of the Master Search Warrant (MSW) and the Master Arrest Warrant (MAW) which are currently in force. The MAW document, authorized by the United States Attorney General, directs the head of the FBI to: "Arrest persons whom I deem dangerous to the public peace and safety. These persons are to be detained and confined until further order." The MSW also instructs the FBI Director to "search certain premises where it is believed that there may be found contraband, prohibited articles, or other materials in violation of the Proclamation of the President of the United States." It includes such items as firearms, short-wave radio receiving sets, cameras,

propaganda materials, printing presses, mimeograph machines, membership and financial records of organizations or groups that have been declared subversive, or may be hereafter declared subversive by the Attorney General."

Since the Senate hearings in 1975, the steady development of highly specialized surveillance capabilities, combined with the exploding computerized information technologies, have enabled a massive data base of personal information to be developed on millions of unsuspecting American citizens. It is all in place awaiting only a presidential declaration to be enforced by both military and civilian police.

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Directive 58 that empowered Robert McFarlane and Oliver North to use the National Security Council to secretly retrofit FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) to manage the country during a national crisis. The 1984 "REX exercises" simulated civil unrest culminating in a national emergency with a contingency plan for the imprisonment of 400,000 people. REX 84 was so secretive that special metal security doors were installed on the FEMA building's fifth floor, the center of the project, and even long-term officials of the Civil Defense Office were prohibited entry. The ostensible purpose of this exercise was to handle an influx of refugees created by a war in Central America, but a more realistic, and well-documented, scenario was the detention of  rebellious American citizens.

Under "REX" the President could declare a state of emergency, empowering the head of FEMA to take control of the internal infrastructure of the United States and suspend the constitution. The President could invoke executive orders 11000 thru 11004 which would:

2-       Draft all citizens into work forces under government supervision.

3-       Empower the postmaster to register all men, women and children.

4-       Seize all airports and private and commercial aircraft.

5-       Seize all housing and establish forced relocation of citizens.

A Listing of U.S. Presidential Executive Orders Relating to Domestic Martial Law:

FEMA, whose secret budget is part and parcel of the Department of Defense, has worked closely with the Pentagon in an effort to avoid the legal restrictions of Posse Comitatus. While FEMA may not have been directly responsible for these precedent-setting cases, the principle of federal control was seen during the Los Angeles riots in 1992 with the federalization of the National Guard and during the siege at Waco, where Army tanks equipped with flame throwers were involved in the final conflagration.

The Deputy Attorney General of California commented at a conference that anyone who attacks the State, even verbally, becomes a revolutionary and an enemy by definition. Louis Guiffreda, who was head of FEMA, stated that "legitimate violence is integral to our form of government, for it is from this source that we can continue to purge our weaknesses."

It is significant to note that the dictionary definition of terrorism - "the calculated use of violence" - corresponds precisely to the government's stated policy of "the use of legitimate violence." One might ask, who are the real terrorists? Guiffreda's remark gives a revealing insight into the thinking of those who have been charged with oversight of the welfare of the citizens in this country. If one's convictions or philosophy does not correspond with the government's agenda, that individual may find himself on the government's enemy list. This makes him a "target" to be "purged" by the use of "legitimate violence."

President Regan signed Presidential Director Number 54 in April of 1984 that allowed FEMA to activate a secret national readiness exercise. This exercise was given the code name REX 84. The purpose of the exercise was to test FEMA's ability to assume military authority. REX 84 was so highly guarded that special metal security doors were installed on the fifth floor of the FEMA building in Washington, D.C. securing the area in which the REX Operational Center was centered.

The exercise required the following:

• Suspension of the Constitution of the United States

• Turning control of the government over to FEMA

• Appointment of military commanders to run state and local governments

• Declaration of Martial Law

To combat possible domestic civil disturbances, national  leaders apply the minimum force necessary to help local and loyal authorities restore law and order. Leaders and Soldiers remain aware that the media often covers civil disturbances. Even when not covered, these disturbances are opportunities to shape the information environment positively toward the US forces and government.

Combating these disturbances may involve the following:

Maintain the essential distribution, transportation, and communications systems.

• Set up roadblocks.

• Cordon off areas.

• Make a show of force.

• Disperse or contain crowds.

• Release riot control agents only when directed to do so. (Only the President can authorize US forces to use riot control agents.)

• Serve as security forces or reserves.

• Initiate needed relief measures, such as distributing food or clothing, or establishing emergency shelters.

• Employ nonlethal munitions and equipment.

The media, print and broadcast (radio, television and the Internet), play a vital role in societies involved in a counterinsurgency. Members of the media have a significant influence and shaping impact on political direction, national security objectives, and policy and national will. The media is a factor in military operations. It is their right and obligation to report to their respective audiences on the use of military force. They demand logistic support and access to military operations while refusing to be controlled. Their desire for immediate footage and on-the-spot coverage of events, and the increasing contact with units and Soldiers (for example, with embedded reporters) require commanders and public affairs officers to provide guidance to leaders and Soldiers on media relations.

However, military planners must provide and enforce ground rules to the media to ensure operations security. Public affairs offices plan for daily briefings and a special briefing after each significant event because the media affect and influence each potential target audience external and internal to the AO. Speaking with the media in a forward-deployed area is an opportunity to explain what our organizations and efforts have accomplished.

Continuous PSYOP are mounted to—

• Counter the effects of insurgent propaganda.

• Relate controls to the security and well-being of the population.

• Portray a favorable governmental image.

Control measures must—

• Be authorized by national laws and regulations

• Be tailored to fit the situation (apply the minimum force required to achieve the desired result).

• Be supported by effective local intelligence.

• Be instituted in as wide an area as possible to prevent bypass or evasion.

• Be supported by good communications.

• Be enforceable.

• Be lifted as the need diminishes.

• Be compatible, where possible, with local customs and traditions.

• Establish and maintain credibility of local government.

The media—the printed medium, radio, television, and the Internet—have a vital role in societies directly and indirectly involved in counterinsurgency. The news media and other information networks’ increasing availability to societies’ leadership, bureaucracies, and populace means members of this news and communication medium have a significant impact on political direction, achieving national security objectives, policy formation, and national will. Media scrutiny of military operations, journalists’ desire for immediate footage and on-the-spot coverage of confrontational events, and the increasing contact with units and Soldiers (including embedded reporters) require that commanders and public affairs officers provide guidance to leaders and Soldiers on media relations. The media affect and influence each potential target audience and personnel external and internal to the AO. Speaking with the media in a secured domestic area is an opportunity to explain what our organizations and efforts have accomplished, but be prepared to field questions regarding perceived negative impacts also.

In addition to these general guidelines, leaders should always consult the public affairs office guidance related to the current operation.

Points to Remember When Doing Media Interviews What to Do When the Media Visits Your AO:

• Be relaxed, confident, and professional.

• Be concise: think about what you will say before you speak

• Avoid using colorful or profane language.

• Stay in your lane. Confine your discussions to areas in which you have firsthand knowledge or where you    have personal experience

• Deal in facts--avoid speculation and hypothetical questions

• Label your opinions as opinions. Don’t get into political discussions.

• Stay on the record. If you say it, they’ll print it.

• Don’t discuss classified information.

• Don’t argue with the reporter. Be firm, and be polite.

• Speak plainly. Don’t use military slang or jargon.

• Protect the record. Correct the “facts" if they are wrong.

• Do not threaten the media representative.

• Politely move the media to an area out of harm’s way where they do not interfere with the performance of the mission.

• Notify the senior person present so he/she can determine what the media wants.

• Cooperate with the reporter within the limits of OPSEC and safety.

• If there are OPSEC or safety concerns that make the interviewing or filming impossible at this time, let the reporter know up front.

• At no time should a media representative’s equipment be confiscated. If you feel a security violation has occurred, notify your chain of command.

•  If you have problems with the media, don’t get emotional. Report the incident through the chain of command to the area public affairs officer.

Relocating Populations

The most severe of the restrictive measures, is accomplished when—

Wide dispersion of the population prevents effective defense, internal security, and control.

Requirements exist to evacuate or populate selected areas.

Leaders can contribute to the implementation of this technique by providing assistance in the following areas:

PSYOP to prepare the population for relocation.

Defense during relocation. If relocation is combined with the defended urban area technique, the leader can further assist, once relocation is completed. Logistic requirements—such as subsistence, transportation, and medical assistance —to facilitate movement and relocation of the population and their possessions.

The state first decides upon its goal (restoration of legitimate government writ), then, produces a plan to accomplish that end. All elements of national power are assigned their roles in carrying out the plan. The government establishes the legal framework and command and control (C2) mechanisms to enable the plan to be implemented.

The legal framework normally includes a series of extraordinary measures that are associated with emergency situations, or even martial law. It will frequently expand military powers into areas delegated solely to the police in “normal times.”

Historically, effective C2 architecture has involved setting up local coordinating bodies with representation from all key parties. This local body directs the counter-insurgency campaign in the AO concerned, though one individual will have the lead. Minimally, such a coordinating body includes appropriate representatives from the civil authority, the police, the intelligence services, and (though not always) the civil population. The most effective use of coordinating bodies has given permanent-party individuals (for example, district officers) responsibility for counterinsurgency C2 in their AOs and control over civil or military assets sent into their AOs. Reinforced intelligence bodies, in particular, have been  assigned as permanent party. Involvement of local officials and civilians can defeat the insurgents’ attempt to undermine the political system.

Military and police forces must be the most visible force to the people. Security forces sent into an area to engage in counterinsurgency perform as follows:

Strategically, they serve as the shield for carrying out reform. It is imperative that military and police forces protect the populace and defend their own bases while simultaneously fighting an insurgency.

Operationally, they systematically restore government control.

Tactically, security forces eliminate insurgent leadership, cadre, and combatants, through death and capture, by co-opting individual members, or by forcing insurgents to leave the area. This is analogous to separating the fish from the sea. The local populations (that also provide the insurgent mass base) are then secure and able to engage in normal activities. The forces also assist with civic action projects.

These actions convey to the people a sense of progress and concern by the government. See: FM 3-19.40 (19-40). Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations. 1 August 2001.

There over 600 official detention camps now designated in the United States, all fully operational and ready to receive prisoners. They are all staffed by full-time guards, but they are, at present, not occupied.

These camps are to be operated by FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) should Martial Law need to be implemented in the United States.

Operations Cable Splicer and Garden Plot are the two sub programs which will be implemented once the Rex 84 program is initiated for its proper purpose.

• Garden Plot is the program to control the population.

• Cable Splicer is the program for an orderly takeover of the state and local governments by the federal government. FEMA is the executive arm of the coming police state and thus will head up all operations. The Presidential Executive Orders already listed on the Federal Register also are part of the legal framework for this operation.

• The camps all have railroad facilities as well as roads leading to and from the detention facilities. Many also have an airport nearby. The majority of the camps can house a population of 20,000 prisoners. Currently, the largest of these facilities is just outside of Fairbanks, Alaska. The Alaskan facility is a massive mental health facility and can hold approximately 2 million people.

• The counterinsurgency plan analyzes the basis of the insurgency in order to determine its form, centers of gravity, and insurgent vulnerabilities. These dictate the most effective type force to employ (either police, militia, and military; or primarily military and police).

The counterinsurgency plan details the scheme to reclaim what has been lost and establish priority of effort and timelines. Concurrently, it outlines how the government intends to secure the critical infrastructure of the state and the government’s centers of power.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Within a joint force, ARSOF assets (less PSYOP and CA units) are ordinarily attached to and under OPCON of a designated joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander. The special operations command and control element (SOCCE) assists the JSOTF commander in fulfilling the supporting or supported commander responsibilities. A SOCCE is based on a special forces operational detachment-B and is augmented with a special communications package and personnel as required. It may include a ranger liaison officer, PSYOP and CA representatives, and special operations aviation personnel. The SOCCE is normally collocated at corps level and above, with smaller liaison teams operating at division level and below. The supported unit provides the SOCCE administrative and logistic support.

The SOCCE is the focal point for ARSOF coordination and synchronization with conventional forces. At corps level, the SOCCE coordinates with the corps operations center, fire support element, deep operations coordination cell, and battlefield coordination detachment to deconflict targets and operations. It provides ARSOF locations through personal coordination and provides overlays and other friendly order of battle data to the fire support element and battlefield coordination detachment. The SOCCE can exercise C2 of designated ARSOF units when the JSOTF commander determines the need.

SPECIAL FORCES LIAISON ELEMENT

A special forces liaison element is a special forces or joint special operations element that conducts liaison between US conventional forces, division-level headquarters, and subordinate brigades and battalions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

.Commanders employ PSYOP (as an element of IO) to influence target audience behaviors that support US national policy objectives. Planning includes personnel with expertise in the region’s culture. PSYOP missions roles include—

• Influencing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign populations.

• Advising commanders of target restrictions during the targeting process (planning for application of effects) to minimize reactions that may adversely affect PSYOP objectives.

• Providing public information (in coordination with the public affairs office) to foreign populations to support humanitarian assistance and to restore or maintain civil order.

All forces assigned an AO or function should determine which departments and agencies are assisting in that AO and coordinate actions so that there is no duplication of effort. Such departments, councils and agencies include—

• National Security Council.

• Department of Defense.

• Department of State.

• Department of Justice.

• Department of the Treasury.

• Department of Homeland Security.

• Department of Agriculture.

• Department of Commerce.

• Central Intelligence Agency.

• Department of Transportation.

Various governmental departments directly administer or support other governmental agencies. Examples of these US agencies are—

• US Agency for International Development.

• The US Coast Guard (under Department of Homeland Security).

• The Federal Bureau of Investigation (under Department of Justice).

• Immigration Customs Enforcement (under Department of Homeland Security).

• Federal Communications Commission.

Security and defense begin concurrently with, or immediately subsequent to, offensive operations. Security of urban centers and defense of key infrastructure are pre-requisites to beginning offensive operations. The entire political administrative unit (State. County, city or incorporated area), as well as each individual community, must be secured all the time. In areas under insurgent influence, it will be necessary to construct defenses around existing urban areas and concentrate rural populations into defendable population units. Normally, this will be accomplished concurrently with counterinsurgency operations, environmental improvement, and population and resource control programs. Techniques for securing and defending the AO include establishing defended urban areas and relocating populations

ORGANIZING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

A successful counterinsurgency depends ultimately and initially on a legitimate and effective justice program integrating law enforcement, the judiciary, and a penal system. The existing justice program may be limited by capability (leadership and training), resources, or corruption, and require direct or indirect efforts to support or even reestablish police services, courts, and prisons. Such efforts must be coordinated with the country team and closely synchronized with other civil-military actions. The responsibility for these efforts may fall initially on US military assets during the initial stages of an operation or when the security situation is untenable for civilian agencies and contract advisors. The division staff judge advocate and provost marshal may require additional technical support from judge advocate and military police assets (for example, administrative and criminal law experts, criminal investigators, and corrections specialists) to support local-, regional-, or national-level justice programs, while setting the conditions for transfer of support to other US governmental or international agencies.

Support to the judiciary may be limited to providing security to the existing courts. To avoid overcrowding in police jails, the courts must have an efficient and timely magistrate capability, ideally co-located with police stations and police jails, to review cases for trial.

Support to the penal system may be limited to monitoring conditions and adherence to basic humanitarian standards or require more comprehensive support to reestablish all levels of incarceration and a rehabilitative programs. Points to remember:

• Local jails are typically co-located with police stations and administered by the lo-cal police to hold suspected criminals until a magistrate determines whether there is sufficient evidence for trial.

• Regional jails are typically run by prison officials to hold detainees referred to trial, but not convicted. Pretrial detainees should not be incarcerated with convicted criminals.

• Prisons hold convicted criminals and are typically designed and divided to address level of inmate risk (high, medium, and low), rehabilitative programs (e.g., violence, drug addiction, sex crimes), and the separation of genders and juvenile offenders.

CORDON AND SEARCH

Cordon and search is a technique used by military and police forces in both urban and rural environments. It is frequently used by counterinsurgency forces conducting a population and resource control mission against small centers of population or subdivisions of a larger community. To be effective, cordon and search operations must have sufficient forces to effectively cordon off and thoroughly search target areas, to include subsurface areas. PSYOP, civil affairs, and specialist interrogation teams should augment cordon and search forces to increase the effectiveness of operations. Consider the following when conducting cordon and search operations:

Allocate ample time to conduct thorough search and interrogation of residents of affected areas.

Operations should be rehearsed thoroughly, whenever possible.

Firm but fair treatment must be the rule. Every effort must be made to avoid any incident that results in unnecessarily alienating the people.

Cordon and search operations may be conducted as follows:

• Disposition of troops should—

• Facilitate visual contact between posts within the cordon.

• Provide for adequate patrolling and immediate deployment of an effective reserve force.

Priority should be given to—

• Sealing the administrative center of the community.

• Occupying all critical facilities.

• Detaining personnel in place.

• Preserving and securing all records, files, and other archives.

Key facilities include—

• Administrative buildings.

• Police stations.

• News media facilities.

• Post offices.

• Communications centers.

• Transportation offices and motor pools.

• Prisons and other places of detention.

• Schools.

• Medical facilities.

Search Techniques include—

• Search teams of squad size organized in assault, support, and security elements. One target is assigned per team.

• Room searches are conducted by two-person teams.

• Room search teams are armed with pistols, assault weapons, and automatic weapons.

• Providing security for search teams screening operations and facilities.

Pre-search coordination includes—

• Between control personnel and screening team leaders.

• Study of layout plans.

• Communications, that is, radio, whistle, and hand signals.

• Disposition of suspects.

• On-site security.

• Guard entrances, exits (to include the roof), halls, corridors, and tunnels.

• Assign contingency tasks for reserve.

• Room searches conducted by two- or three-person teams.

• Immobilize occupants with one team member.

• Search room with other team member.

• Search all occupants. When available, a third team member should be the recorder.

• Place documents in a numbered envelope and tag the associated individual with a corresponding number.

SCREENING AND DOCUMENTING THE POPULATION

Screening and documentation include following:

• Systematic identification and registration.

• Issuance of individual identification cards containing—
       A unique number.
       Picture of individual.
       Personal identification data.
       Fingerprints.

• An official stamp (use different colors for each administration region).

• Family group census cards, an official copy of which is retained at the local police agency. These must include a picture and appropriate personal data.

• Frequent use of mobile and fixed checkpoints for inspection, identification, and registration of documents.

• Preventing counterfeiting of identification and registration documents by laminating and embossing.

Programs to inform the population of the need for identification and registration.

Covert surveillance is a collection effort with the responsibility fixed at the intelligence/security division or detective division of the police department. Covert techniques, ranging from application of sophisticated electronics systems to informants, should include—

• Informant nets. Reliability of informants should be verified. Protection of identity is a must.

• Block control. Dividing a community or populated area into zones where a trusted resident reports on the activities of the population. If the loyalty of block leaders is questionable, an informant net can be established to verify questionable areas.

The key to success is effective and actionable intelligence at the local level. Many insurgents

are “local boys” swept up in the excitement of the moment. Others are outsiders, easily identified by the locals. In either case, when insurgents overplay their hand and place the community at risk, it is likely local personnel will identify these insurgents to the authorities. This information may lead to the development of sound intelligence, enabling commanders to focus operations toward specific objectives.

Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing counterinsurgency operations adhere to several fundamentals. While many apply to conventional operations, others are counterinsurgency- specific.

Cameras co-located with MASINT systems, such as REMBASS, and activated when those systems are triggered can give the commander additional “eyes on” named areas of interest without wasting manpower by continuously staffing an observation post in those locations.

Providing patrols with a digital camera or video camera can greatly assist in the debriefing process and allow the intelligence staff personnel to make their own judgments about items of interest that the patrol reports. Videotaping of events, such as a demonstration, can allow analysts who were not on the scene to identify key elements, leaders, and potential indicators to help preclude future incidents. Gun-camera images from aircraft that can provide a stand-off reconnaissance platform may give valuable insight into enemy TTPs.

Thermal sights on a vehicle patrolling an urban street late at night may note the hot engine of a vehicle on the side of the road, possibly indicating suspicious activity. Military police forces provide a robust and dynamic combat capability during a counter insurgency.

Military police Soldiers possess the diverse mobility capabilities, lethality in weapons mix, and trained communications skills to operate in any environment. The actions of the 18th Military Police Brigade supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate the diversity and flexibility of military police functions. These Soldiers conducted over 24,000 combat patrols; processed over 3,600 enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and insurgents; confiscated over 7,500 weapons; and trained over 10,000 Iraqi police officers. Military police patrols came under direct or indirect attack over 300 times throughout the operation.

The five military police functions—maneuver and mobility support operations, area security, police intelligence operations, law and order, and internment/resettlement operations— all apply to counterinsurgency operations.

MILITARY WORKING DOGS

Military working dogs are a largely untapped resource. Dogs are trained in many skills, some of which can make a difference between success and failure of many combat missions. Dogs are trained for patrolling, searching buildings, scouting, or explosive detection. All of these skills compliment performing the five military police functions. The ability of dogs to detect an ambush and to find an explosive device planted by insurgents can be critical to the overall success of the mission. The use of military working dog teams to increase combat potential and enhance response shortages is limited only by a lack of training on how to employ dogs. Dogs cannot be used as a security measure against detainees. They can be used to reinforce security measures against penetration and attack by enemy forces. Some examples of employment techniques are—

• Perimeter patrolling.

• Main supply route patrolling.

• Security of designated personnel, units, or facilities.

• Use during checkpoints and roadblocks.

• Enemy prisoner of war, detainee, and insurgent control.

• Mine and tunnel detection.

• Area reconnaissance operations.

TYPES OF CROWDS

There are four types of crowds:

• Casual crowd. Required elements of the casual crowd are space and people.

• Sighting crowd. Includes casual crowd elements and an event. The event providesthe group’s common bond.

• Agitated crowd. Possesses the three elements of the sighting crowd plus the element of emotion.

• Mob. Characterized by hostility and aggression. A mob is an agitated crowd involved in a physical activity.

To control the mob requires simultaneous actions. The primary goal is to reduce the emotional levels of the individuals within the mob. This action will de-escalate the aggressiveness and potential violence of the crowd. Physical force of some type may be necessary to quell the disturbance.

CROWD LEADERSHIP

Leadership affects greatly the intensity and direction of crowd behavior. A skillful agitator

can convert a group of resentful people into an angry mob and direct their aggression and anger toward the control group. The first person to start giving clear orders authoritatively is likely to be followed. Radical leaders can easily take charge, exploit the crowd’s mood, and direct it toward a convenient target.

It is important to note that the leader of the crowd or group does not necessarily fit into one category. The leader may be combative, vocal, or seemingly low-key and may change roles as needed. Properly identifying the leader of an angry or potentially violent group and skillfully removing the leader without causing additional violence is key to defusing a potentially dangerous situation.

CROWD TACTICS

Crowd tactics can be unplanned or planned, violent or not. The more organized and purposeful a crowd becomes, the more likely the tactics used will have been planned. Organized mobs will try to defeat the control force by employing several different types of tactics.

These tactics include—

• Constructing barricades.

• Using Molotov cocktails, rocks, slingshots, and smoke grenades.

Feinting and flanking actions.

Crowd behavior during a civil disturbance is essentially emotional and without reason. The feelings and the momentum generated have a tendency to cause the whole group to follow the example displayed by its worst members. Skillful agitators or subversive elements exploit these psychological factors during disorders. Regardless of the reason for violence, the results may consist of indiscriminate burning and looting, or open and violent attacks on officials, buildings, and innocent passersby. Rioters may set fire to buildings and vehicles to—

• Block the advance of troops.

• Create confusion and diversion.

• Achieve goals of property destruction, looting, and sniping. Mobs will often use various types of weapons against authorities. These include but are not limited to—

• Verbal abuse.

• Use of perceived innocents or weak persons (such as the elderly, women and children) as human shields.

• Thrown and blunt impact objects (such as rocks, bricks, and clubs).

• Vehicles and other large movable objects.

• Firearms, explosives, and other pyrotechnic devices.

TYPES OF RESISTERS

Individuals can be categorized according to what level of force they can use or what threat they present:

• Complacent resisters. Complacent resisters are nonverbal. They look at you when you talk to them but do not reply in any way. They become limp when touched or forced to move their body. They can very quickly become violent and physically combative. Don’t underestimate them.

• Vocal resisters. Vocal resisters offer a verbal reply and, when touched, highlight themselves in an effort to gain the attention of the media.

• Combative resisters. Combative resisters pose the greatest danger to the control force. They are not passive once they are touched. Place the individual in a prone position, cuff them, and remove them from the area.

CROWD CONTROL

Leaders choose their options based on an assessment of the crowd. Leaders select the combination of control techniques and force options they believe will influence the particular situation most effectively (based on METT-TC). Leaders choose the response they expect to reduce the intensity of the situation. Options to consider for crowd control are—

• Monitor the crowd to gather intelligence and observe to determine whether leaders have emerged, volatility has increased, and movement.

• Block the crowd’s advance upon a facility or area.

• Disperse the crowd in order to prevent injury or prevent the destruction of property.

• Contain the crowd to limit it to the area it is occupying. This prevents it from spreading to surrounding areas and communities.

CONTAINMENT VERSUS DISPERSAL

Dispersal may result in a crowd breaking into multiple groups, causing greater problems and continued threat to the control forces. A contained crowd has a limited duration; their numbers are likely to diminish as individual needs take precedence over those of the crowd.

Issue a proclamation to assist with dispersing a crowd. A proclamation officially establishes the illegal nature of a crowd’s actions, and it puts the populace on official notice regarding the status of their actions. If a proclamation is issued, ensure action is taken to enforce it. Nonaction will be seen as a sign of weakness.

When issuing a proclamation, remember the following:

• Intent cannot exceed response capability.

• Do not disclose the type of force/munitions to be used.

CROWD CONTROL TECHNIQUES

. Use the following techniques to control crowds:

• Ensure that ROE, levels of force and uses, and the commander’s intent (to include non lethal weapon and lethal options, if necessary) are clearly understood by all.

• Determine in advance the recent psychological characteristics of demonstrations and mobs.

• Identify local officials in advance. Know their office and cell phone numbers.

• Establish command relationships and the authority to fire nonlethal weapons munitions.

• Make an extraction plan and have flexible withdrawal drills.

• Always maintain a lethal overwatch of a control force. When marksmen are deployed, keep them covered and out-of-sight. Designated marksman teams build confidence in the members of the control force.

• Always maintain a reserve force to reinforce the control force. Hold reserves out-of-sight.

• Know who the media representatives are and where they are located. Ask them in advance the theme of any story and information they are developing.

• Be reasonable and balanced. However, a mob’s perceived lack of risk encourages rioters.

• Move the crowd, but don’t smash them. They will fight if smashed.

• Maximize distance and barriers between crowd and control formations. Use nonlethal weapons munitions to create a standoff distance.

• If the use of force level escalates to a deadly force, adjusted aim points (head shots) with nonlethal weapons munitions can produce lethal effects.

• Create nonlethal weapons range cards for static positions.

• Consider environmental conditions and their effect on the performance of less-than-lethal munitions.

• Keep in mind the potential for a lethal outcome is possible in all types of missions.

COMMUNITY MAP

• Obtain a map of the area or the community. If no map is available, draw one to scale. Indicate road networks (include main and secondary roads).

• . Show location of such important places as religious institutions, schools, community halls, and marketplaces.

• Indicate distances to adjacent communities.

• Describe what determines the center of the community and what factors are most important in giving the community its identification.

• . Describe the relation of the community as to the political, trade, school, and religious areas with that of the adjoining communities.

• . Describe the weather and terrain features directly affecting the location or life of the community.

HISTORY (AS IT AFFECTS THE PRESENT SITUATION)

Identify important people and events in the community’s history. Consider the following:

• Natural crises in the history of the community.

• Incidents giving rise to conflicts or cooperation in the community.

• Immigration and emigration.

• Outstanding leaders and famous citizens in the community.

• Prior interaction with foreign militaries.

POPULATION

Obtain the following information:

• Census.

• Common occupations of inhabitants.

• Ethnic groups present, if applicable. (i.e., African-American, Latino, Asian, Other)

COMMUNICATION

Determine how inhabitants, groups, organizations, and governmental entities communicate within the community and with other communities. Consider the following:

• Transportation (roads, water, rail, air).

• Electronic (telephones, television, radio, internet, telegraph).

• Printed material (newspaper, posters, magazines).

• Mail facilities.

• Connections with other communities.

• Degree of self-sufficiency or isolation.

COMMUNITY INTEGRATION

Determine the groups or individuals that are independent of the local government; for example, groups or individuals directly responsible to an outside or higher government. Determine the effects they have on the community. Determine the attitude of the local citizens toward these individuals.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Consider the following factors when assessing the economic situation:

• Natural resources.

• Industries. Agriculture.

• Crops and products, markets, ownership,